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et al.: FRE and NY Evidence Comparison

RULE 407: SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL
MEASURES
Federal Rule of Evidence 407 states:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken
previously, would have made the event less likely to occur,
evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove
negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event.
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of
subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as
proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary
measures, if controverted, or impeachment. 1
Federal Rule of Evidence 407 states that a party may not
introduce evidence of subsequent remedial measures when the
2
evidence is offered to establish culpable conduct or negligence.
1. FED. R. EvID. 407. It should be noted that the word "event" as it
appears in Rule 407 "refers to the time of the accident or injury to the
plaintiff, not to the time of manufacture of the product or creation of the
hazard." Huffman v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 908 F.2d 1470, 1481 (10th Cir.
1990). Therefore, "[b]y its terms, clearly the Rule does not encompass
remedial measures taken before the 'event' in question." Id. See Raymond v.
Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1523 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that "[u]nder
Rule 407, only measures which take place after the 'event' are excluded. The
term 'event' refers to the accident that precipitated the suit"). It should also be
noted that "Rule 407 only applies to a defendant's voluntary actions." Pau v.
Yosemite Park and Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880, 888 (9th Cir. 1990).
2. Id. Moreover, "[e]vidence of subsequent measures is no more
admissible to rebut a claim of non-negligence than it is to prove negligence
directly." Hardy v. Chemtron Corp., 870 F.2d 1007, 1011 (5th Cir. 1989). In
Hardy, the plaintiff argued that evidence of a design change made after an
accident should have been admitted at trial in order to "impeach [the
defendant's] 'trial position' that negligent wiring had not caused [the
plaintiffs] injury .... " Id. at 1010-11. The court, in determining that the
evidence was properly excluded, stated that this argument, "minus a double
negative, amounts to saying that [the plaintiff] should have been allowed to
adduce evidence of the rewiring to prove [the defendant's] negligence." id. at
1011. However, it has been held that evidence of subsequent remedial
measures may be admissible to prove that a plaintiff was not contributorily
negligent. Rimkus v. Northwest Colorado Ski Corp., 706 F.2d 1060 (10th Cir.
1983). In Rimkus, the court held that evidence of repairs made after a skiing
accident was admissible at trial and stated that "[w]here it relates to the alleged
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This rule codifies the common law doctrine "which excludes
evidence of subsequent remedial measures as proof of an
admission of fault."' 3 There are two justifications for the
exclusion of subsequent remedial measures. First, evidence of a
subsequent repair is of little probative value, since the repair may
not be an admission of negligence and may not necessarily
demonstrate a lack of due care. 4 Second, the introduction of such
evidence might prevent people from taking safety precautions in
order to make the subject of the accident more secure as a
response to the accident. 5 The Rule thus seeks to further the
public policy of promoting subsequent remedial measures.
A large variety of remedial measures may be inadmissible
pursuant to Rule 407: "As a basic principle the rule will apply to
any measure which, if taken prior to the accident, would have
made the injury less likely to occur.", 6 For example, Rule 407
contributory negligence of plaintiff [the evidence] should not be considered
prejudicial." Id. at 1063, 1066.
3. FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note.
4. Id. (stating that "[t]he conduct is not in fact an admission, since the
conduct is equally consistent with injury by mere accident or through
contributory negligence"). See GLENN WEISSENBERGER, WEISSENBERGER'S
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 407.3, at 132 (2d ed. 1995) (stating that "evidence of
subsequent remedial actions is thought to have low or nonexistent probative
value in establishing negligence").
5. FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note. See 2 MCCORMICK ON

EVIDENCE § 267, at 200 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) (asserting
that "[t]he predominant reason for excluding such evidence, however, is not
lack of probative significance, but rather a policy against discouraging the
taking of safety measures").
6. WEISSENBERGER, supra note 4, § 407.2 at 132 (stating that "[v]irtually
any kind of subsequent remedial action is within the purview of Rule 407, and
the Rule is not directed simply to the repair of a mechanical device after the
mechanical device causes personal injury"). But cf. Patrick v. South Central
Bell Tel. Co., 641 F.2d 1192, 1196 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that evidence of
repairs which merely restored the accident site to the condition before the
accident and did not remedy the dangerous condition was not excludable
pursuant to Rule 407 because "the Rule prohibits evidence of post-accident
changes that make things different or better than they were at the time of an
accident"); Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1343 (5th Cir. 1978)
(stating that in a negligence action, it is not appropriate to invoke Federal Rule
of Evidence 407 to exclude evidence of a subsequent remedial measure where
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has been applied to prevent the admission of evidence of rule
changes made by a company, the firing of an employee, installing
safety devices, 7 or changing a business practice. 8

A problem has arisen, however, regarding the interpretation of
the terms "negligence" and "culpable conduct." In particular, the

question of whether Federal Rule of Evidence 407 applies to
actions based on strict products liability has been the subject of
vigorous debate among the federal circuit courts. Neither the text
of the rule nor the Advisory Committee's Note address the issue
of whether Rule 407 should apply to these types of actions. 9
However, courts have looked at the underlying rationale of the
rule as well as the policy reasons behind the rule to determine if
Rule 407 should be extended to cover strict products liability
cases. 10 On one hand, it has been asserted that the term -culpable
conduct" encompasses "the creation of a product defect," 11 and
that the policy behind Rule 407 applies with equal force to
actions based on strict products liability. 12 On the other hand. it
it was made pursuant to a government mandate, because it was not made -out
of a sense of social responsibility").
7. FED. R. EviD. 407 advisory committee's note.
8. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 267 at 201. On the other hand, since the
policy for excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures does not apply
when they are done by a third person, this evidence is usually admissible. Id.:
See Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 889
(5th Cir. 1983) (stating that "neither the text of rule 407 nor the policy
underlying it excludes evidence of subsequent repairs made by someone other
than the defendant") (citations omitted).
9. See FED. R. EvID. 407; FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's
note.
10. See WEISSENBERGER, supra note 4, § 407.5 at 136 (stating that i[tlhe
issue, however, is not necessarily resolved by focusing upon a literal reading
of the text of the rule. Some courts and commentators would rather look to
whether the policies that underlie Rule 407 are furthered by admitting this type
of evidence").
11. Traylor v. Husqvarna Motor, 988 F.2d 729, 733 (7th Cir. 1993)
(citing Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 733 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1984) and
Probus v. K-Mart, Inc., 794 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1986)).
12. Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980). cert. denied.
449 U.S. 1080 (1981). In Wenzer. the court stated that
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has been argued that the policy behind Rule 407 does not apply to
strict products liability because strict liability focuses on the
defective nature of the product, while negligence focuses on the
defendant's conduct. 13 Additionally, it has been asserted that

major producers would not avoid making changes to a product
known to be defective and take the risk of being sued by others
merely to avoid admission of this evidence at trial. 14 As a result,
the federal circuits are split concerning whether or not strict
products liability falls within the language of Rule 407.15 The
[i]t is difficult to understand why this policy should apply any differently
where the complaint is based on strict liability ....

From a defendant's

point of view it is the fact that the evidence may be used against him
which will inhibit subsequent repairs or improvement. It makes no
difference to the defendant on what theory the evidence is admitted; his
inclination to make subsequent improvements will be similarly
repressed.
Id. at 857. See Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634, 637 (9th Cir. 1986);
Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that
"[in either case [of negligence or strict products liability], if evidence of
subsequent remedial measures is admissible to prove liability, the incentive to
take such measures will be reduced").
13. Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Svc., Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, 1327 (10th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 958 (1984).
14. Id. at 1327. See WEISSENBERGER, supra note 4, § 407.5 at 136.
Weissenberger states:
The advocates of admitting evidence of a subsequent remedial measure
argue that an action based upon strict product liability does not require
the plaintiff to prove that the manufacturer was negligent in its design,
manufacture or marketing of a product. The plaintiff need only prove
the product was in a defective condition and unreasonably dangerous
when it left the possession of the manufacturer. Logically, because the
plaintiff need not prove manufacturer negligence, evidence of
subsequent remedial measures should be admissible to prove the defect
in the product that injured the plaintiff.... [In addition,] [p]roponents
of admitting evidence of subsequent remedial measures in products
liability actions argue that it is absurd to believe that a manufacturer
would forgo repairs in a product's design or manufacture in order to
avoid the admission at trial of evidence of its subsequent changes in the
product.
Id.
15. See Patricia A. Brass, Comment, Federal Rule Of Evidence 407:
Should It Apply To Products Liability?, I1 TOURO L. REV. 253, 263, 267-68
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great majority of the circuits apply Rule 407 to bar evidence of

subsequent remedial measures in strict products liability cases. 16
However, a minority of the circuits, specifically the Eighth and
the Tenth Circuits, allow evidence of subsequent remedial
measures to be admitted in strict products liability cases. 17
After Rule 407 was enacted, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that this rule applies to strict
products liability actions. 18 In Cann v. Ford Motor Company, 19
the Second Circuit further explained that although Rule 407 does
not specifically mention strict products liability, the drafters of
the Federal Rules of Evidence "left many gaps and omissions in
the rules in the expectation that common-law principles would be
applied to fill them." 20 The court determined that the policy
(1994) (stating that "[t]he minority view followed by two federal circuits is
that Rule 407 does not apply to strict products liability cases" while "[t]he
majority view, prevalent in the federal courts, states that Rule 407 applies to
actions based on strict products liability and subsequent remedial measures
taken by defendants should not be admitted at trial").
16. See, e.g., Gauthier v. AMF, Inc.. 788 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1986):
Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1984): Grenada Steel
Indus., Inc., v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1983): Hall v.
American S.S. Co., 688 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1982): Josephs v. Harris Corp..
677 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1982); Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d
848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981); Roy v. Star Chopper
Co., 584 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979).
17. See, e.g., Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc.. 716 F.2d 1322
(10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 958 (1984); Robbins v. Farmers
Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788 (8th Cir. 1977).
18. Canm v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982).
19. Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied.
456 U.S. 960 (1982). In Cairn, the plaintiff was injured by a car manufactured
by the defendant. Id. at 56. The plaintiff though the car was in -park" and
attempted to get out. Id. Because of a defect in the car, it slipped into reverse.
striking and injuring the plaintiff as she was getting out. Id. At trial, the court
barred evidence of an extra instruction added to the owner's manual and a
change in the design of the transmission which were both made after the
accident occurred. Id. at 59. The Second Circuit affirmed this decision. Id.
20. Id. at 60.
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behind Rule 407 of promoting subsequent remedial measures
applied to strict products liability actions. 21 The court reasoned
that though the focus of negligence and strict products liability
actions may be different, "the defendant must pay the judgment
in both situations, regardless of where the jury's attention
focused when they found against him. '' 22 Thus, the Second
Circuit determined that "although negligence and strict products
liability causes of action are distinguishable, no distinction
between the two justifies the admission of evidence of subsequent
' 23
remedial measures in strict products liability actions."
Accordingly, in order to preserve the policy reasons set forth in
the Advisory Committee's Note of Rule 407, the Second Circuit
held that Rule 407 was intended to encompass actions based on
24
strict products liability.
In In re Joint Eastern District and Southern District Asbestos
Litigation,25 the Second Circuit held that a manufacturer's
warning placed on its asbestos product subsequent to an asbestosrelated death was a remedial measure and therefore inadmissible
pursuant to Rule 407.26 The court explained that "[w]e have
previously held that Rule 407 applies in all products liability
21. Id. The court stated that "[s]ince the policy underlying Rule 407 not to
discourage persons from taking remedial measures is relevant to defendants
sued under either theory, we do not see the significance of the distinction
[between the two]." Id.

22. Id. The Second Circuit asserted that "[a] potential defendant must be
equally concerned regardless of the theoretical rubric under which this highly
prejudicial, and extremely damaging evidence, is admitted." Id. (citations
omitted).

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 995 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1993), rev'd on other grounds sub non.
Malcom v. National Gypsum Co., 995 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1993). In re Joint
Eastern & Southern District Asbestos Litigation was based on exposure of
numerous people to asbestos which resulted in personal injuries, and in some
cases, death. Id. at 344. Many of the complaints were consolidated and tried
together. Id. During trial, evidence of a warning placed on the asbestos after
the plaintiffs were exposed was admitted. Id. at 345. The Second Circuit
concluded that the evidence should have been excluded pursuant to Rule 407.
Id.
26. Id. at 345.
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actions, whether founded on negligence or strict liability in
tort. " 2 7

In contrast, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits do not apply Rule
407 to strict products liability cases. 2 8 In Herndon v. Seven Bar
Flying Service, Inc.,29 the Tenth Circuit held that -rule [407]
should be narrowly construed .... [l]ts applicability in strict

liability cases is not expressly provided for and has been
rejected." 30 The court reasoned that because the issue in
negligence cases concerns the defendant's conduct and strict
products liability cases focuses on the defective nature of the
product, the policy behind the rule does not apply to strict
31
products liability actions.

27. Id.
28. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
29. 716 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 958 (1984). In
Herndon, following a fatal airplane crash, the manufacturer subsequently
replaced a defectively designed pitch trim switch which was the alleged cause
of the accident. Id. at 1324. A notice which instructed aircraft owners to
modify the pitch trim switch was allowed into evidence by the trial court. Id.
at 1325.
30. Id. at 1331.
31. Id. at 1327. See Huffman v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 908 F.2d 1470,
1481 (10th Cir. 1990) (refusing to overrule prior precedent from the Tenth
Circuit holding that Rule 407 is inapplicable to cases based on strict products
liability); see also Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d
788 (8th Cir. 1977). The Eighth Circuit stated that
[w]e have applied the Ault rationale in allowing proof of postoccurrence design modification and to a subsequent remedial instruction,
and find no reason to bar its applicability to Rule 407 since Rule 407 is,
by its terms, confined to cases involving negligence or other culpable
conduct. The doctrine of strict liability by its very nature does not
include these elements.
Id. at 793. But see DeLuryea v. Winthrop Lab., 697 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1983).
In DeLuiyea, the Eighth Circuit held that in a strict liability action based on
failure to provide an adequate warning, Rule 407 is applicable to exclude
evidence of the subsequent warning. Id. at 228-29. The court reasoned that in
inadequate warning cases, the issue is whether the warning was adequate.
regardless of whether it was gauged in terms of negligence or strict products
liability. Id. at 229. The court stated that
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the conclusion in Robbins -- that the doctrine of strict liability by its
nature does not include negligence or culpable conduct -- does not apply
to the circumstances in this case. . . . The issue of due care in giving

adequate warning, essentially in the same terms used to define
negligence, is placed squarely in the strict liability instruction.
Foreseeability is an inherent consideration in determining negligence,
and the instruction makes it so with respect to strict liability. . . . [The]

[d]efendant's conduct in giving the warning is in issue. Consequently,
the reasoning in Robbins, that strict liability does not include negligence
or culpable conduct, does not apply to the circumstances of this case.
Id. at 228-29. Thus, the Eighth Circuit made an exception to its general rule
not to apply Federal Rule of Evidence 407 to strict products liability actions,
holding that Rule 407 excluded evidence of a subsequent remedial measure in a
failure to warn case framed in terms of strict liability. Id. at 229. As a result,
the Eighth Circuit has questioned the propriety of its determination that Rule
407 does not apply to actions based on strict products liability. Burke v. Deere
& Co., 6 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1063 (1994). The
court in Burke stated in a footnote that "this case illustrates the dangers
inherent in our present approach [of refusing to apply Rule 407 to cases based
on strict products liability] and. . . it may indeed be wise to revisit the issue
en banc in a proper case." Id. at 506 n. 11. Nevertheless, the Burke court held
that Rule 407 did not apply to the plaintiffs action to recover for personal
injuries, which was based on strict liability. Id. at 501, 506. Accordingly, it
determined that evidence of a field modification program and a decal program
instituted after the plaintiff's accident was admissible to prove the existence of
a dangerous defect in the defendant's product. Id. at 506 (stating that "[it is
the law of this circuit that Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
prohibits the introduction of subsequent remedial measures to demonstrate the
negligence or culpable conduct of the defendant, does not preclude the
introduction of such evidence in strict liability cases"). The Eighth Circuit has
not yet changed its view to that of the majority, and still declines to apply Rule
407 to strict products liability actions other than those concerning a failure to
warn. See generally Wood v. Morbark Indus., Inc., 70 F.3d 1201, 1207 n.3
(11th Cir. 1995) (stating that "[t]he Eighth Circuit originally refused to apply
Rule 407 to strict liability cases. . . . [but] the court has found exceptions to

this circumscription and even has questioned the sagacity of its original view")
(citations omitted); Lockley v. Deere & Co., 933 F.2d 1378, 1386 (8th Cir.
1991) (holding that "the existence and substance of the decal program
constituted evidence of a subsequent remedial measure that was relevant to the
strict liability issue and not precluded by Fed.R.Evid. 407"); Donahue v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 866 F.2d 1008, 1013 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating that "[ilt
has long been the law of this Circuit that Rule 407 does not preclude the
introduction of evidence of subsequent remedial measures in a strict liability
case").
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The leading example of the minority view regarding the
admissibility of subsequent remedial measures in strict products
liability actions is the California Supreme Court's decision in
Ault v. InternationalHarvester Co. ,32 a case decided prior to the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In Ault, the court
held that the prohibition against admitting subsequent remedial
measures into evidence did not extend to strict products liability

cases. 33 The court explained that the text of section 1551 of the
California Evidence Code 34 did not include strict liability
actions. 35 In addition, the court asserted that the policy reasons
behind the rule did not apply to actions based on strict products
liability, because the rule would not encourage safety precautions
in this type of situation. 36 The California Supreme Court stated
that the most prevalent type of defendant in a products liability
action is a company that engages in the mass production of
goods. 37 This type of producer would not avoid improving its

product and risk further lawsuits merely because the change
32. 528 P.2d 1148 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1974). In Ault, the plaintiff received
injuries as a result of a car accident involving an automobile manufactured by
the defendant. Id. at 1149. Plaintiff alleged that the accident was caused by a
defectively designed gear box. Id. Evidence at trial indicated that the defendant
changed the design of the gear box after plaintiff's accident. Id.
33. Id. at 1150.
34. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1151 (West 1966). The section states: "Vhen,
after the occurrence of an event, remedial or precautionary measures are
taken, which, if taken previously, would have tended to make the event less
likely to occur, evidence of such subsequent measures is inadmissible to prove
negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event." Id.
35. Ault, 528 P.2d at 1150 (stating that "[slection 1151 by its own terms
excludes evidence of subsequent remedial or precautionary measures only
when such evidence is offered to prove negligence or culpable conduct. In an
action based upon strict liability against a manufacturer, negligence or
culpability is not a necessary ingredient").
36. Id. The California Supreme Court reasoned that i[wlhile the
provisions of section 1151 may fulfill [an] anti-deterrent function [and
encourage individuals to make subsequent repairs] in the typical negligence
action, the provision plays no comparable role in the products liability field."
Id. at 1151.
37. Id. at 1152.
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could be admissible against it in a single pending lawsuit. 38 The
court believed that "[i]n the products liability area, the

exclusionary rule of section 1151 does not affect the primary
conduct of the mass producer of goods, . . . [therefore] the
purpose of section 1151 is not applicable to a strict liability

case."' 39 The court noted that these types of producers have
economic incentives to improve their defective products, and do
40
not need the incentive provided by the exclusionary rule.
Despite the similarities between section 1151 of the California
Evidence Code and Rule 407, the drafters of the Federal Rules of

Evidence chose not to address this issue, leaving the decision to
the federal courts.

Rule 407 lists additional purposes which can justify the
admission of subsequent remedial measures. 4 1 The evidence may
be admitted "when offered for another purpose, such as proving

ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measurers, if
controverted, or impeachment." ' 42 This list is illustrative, and
38. Id.
39. Id. (emphasis added). In addition, it stated that "[in the products
liability area, the exclusionary rule of section 1151 ...serves merely as a

shield against potential liability." Id. at 1152.
40. Id.
41. FED. R. EVID. 407.
42. FED. R. EvID. 407. See Pitasi v. Stratton Corp., 968 F.2d 1558 (2d
Cir. 1992). In Pitasi, a skier sued a ski resort for paralysis he sustained when
he skied down a trail which was closed due to dangerous conditions. Id. at
1560. Only the top entrance to the trail had been blocked off, and the trail was
accessible from other entrances which had not been blocked off and could be
entered by crossing over from other trails. Id. Immediately after the accident,
the defendants placed ropes and warning signs by all of the possible entrances
to the dangerous trail. Id. The defendant's main defense at trial was that the
plaintiffs were contributorily negligent because the dangerous conditions were
so obvious that no signs or barricades were needed at the side entrances to the
trail. Id. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to introduce evidence of
the subsequent remedial measure because the plaintiff was using the evidence
to rebut the defendant's claim that barriers at the side entrance were not
feasible because the dangerous conditions were so obvious. Id. at 1561; see
also Clausen v. Sea-3, Inc., 21 F.3d 1181, 1191-92 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding
that evidence of replacement of a ramp made after after the plaintiff fell and
injured himself was admissible even though it was a subsequent remedial
measure because "control of the ramp area where [the plaintiffs] injury
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does not limit the purposes for which subsequent remedial
measures may be admissible. 43 In order for this evidence to be
admitted at trial, the other purpose must be in dispute.44 In

occurred was a material issue in [the] case"); Traylor v. Husqvarna Motor,
988 F.2d 729, 734 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that there was "no basis for
excluding [evidence of the subsequent remedial measure] to impeach testimony
by [the defendant's] expert witnesses. Rule 407 expressly permits the use of
evidence of subsequent repairs for purposes of impeachment").
43. See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 856 (4th Cir 1980) (stating
that "[w]e agree[] that the exceptions listed in Rule 407... are illustrative and
not exhaustive"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981). However, the court in
Upjohn also asserted that "Rule 407 promotes an important policy of
encouraging subsequent remedial measurers. If this policy is to be effectuated
we should not be too quick to read new exceptions into the rule because by so
doing there is a danger of subverting the policy underlying the rule." Id. at
856; see also Unterburger v. Snow Co., 630 F.2d 599, 603 (8th Cir. 1980)
(allowing evidence of a subsequent remedial measure in a negligence action for
the purposes of identifying the grain elevator that caused the plaintiff's injury
when there was a dispute over which model had caused the accident); Kenny v.
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 581 F.2d 351, 356 (3d Cir. 1978)
(allowing evidence of a remedial measure taken at the scene of a rape after the
rape took place to show that the lighting conditions at the scene were adequate
when the rape occurred), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979); Rozier v. Ford
Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1343 (5th Cir. 1978) (stating that the policy behind
Rule 407 of encouraging further safety precautions would allow this type of
evidence to show that a defendant had "kmowledge of the dangerous
condition").
44. FED. R. EviD. 407. See FED. R. EviD. 407 advisory committee's note
(stating that "[t]he requirement that the other purpose be controverted calls for
automatic exclusion unless a genuine issue be present and allows the opposing
party to lay the groundwork for exclusion by making an admission"). See Hull
v. Chevron Inc., 812 F.2d 584 (10th Cir. 1987). In Hull, Chevron sought to
introduce evidence that the person they hired to drill a well was in control of
the day-to-day drilling operations, and that Chevron had no control over the
forklift which injured the plaintiff. Id. at 585-86. The Tenth Circuit affirmed
the district court's exclusion of the evidence based on the fact that the issue of
control of the forklift was not in dispute. Id. at 587. The court of appeals
stated that "Chevron's proffered evidence would be either cumulative or
trespass inferentially into the Rule 407 prohibited terrain of proof of culpable
conduct." Id.
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addition, the evidence is subject to balancing under Federal Rule
of Evidence 403.45
Even though the New York evidence rules have not been
codified, the New York common law rule concerning subsequent
remedial measures, when applied to ordinary negligence cases, is
similar to Rule 407 and is based upon the same policy

considerations. In Corcoran v. Village of Peekskill,4 6 the New
York Court of Appeals held that evidence of subsequent remedial
measures was not admissible at trial to prove negligence because

"such evidence has no legitimate bearing upon the defendant's

negligence or knowledge .

. .

.,,47

The court reasoned that this

type of evidence did not prove that the object alleged to have
caused the plaintiff's injuries was not safe prior to the occurrence
of the accident. 48 In addition, the court explained that the
introduction of such evidence could cause prejudice and place
undue bias in the minds of the jury. 4 9 It believed that a jury

would view the evidence as an admission of negligence by the
defendant which, in fact, it is not. 50

45. FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note; FED. R. EvID. 403.
Rule 403 provides that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Id.
46. 108 N.Y. 151, 15 N.E. 309 (1888). In Corcoran, the issue was
whether evidence that a fence was constructed around an area of property
where the plaintiff had been injured should have been admitted at trial. Id. at
154, 15 N.E. at 309.
47. Id. at 155, 15 N.E. at 310.
48. Id. at 155, 15 N.E. at 309. The court stated that
[sluch evidence does not tend to prove that the party sued knew, or was
bound to know, that the machine or structure was imperfect, unsafe or
out of repair. . . . [and] has no tendency whatever.. . to show that the
machine or structure was not previously in a reasonably safe and perfect
condition, or that the defendant ought, in the exercise of reasonable care
and diligence, to have made it more perfect, safe and secure.
Id. at 155, 15 N.E. at 309-10.
49. Id. at 155, 15 N.E. at 310.
50. Id. at 155-56, 15 N.E. at 309-10. The court stated that this would be
unfair to a defendant because a determination of negligence should be based on
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However, New York's application of the exclusionary rule to
products liability cases follows neither the majority nor the
minority circuit court rule. In determining the admissibility of
subsequent remedial measures in actions based on strict products
liability, New York makes a distinction between manufacturing
defect and design defect cases.
In Caprarav. Chrysler Corp.,51 the court of appeals held that
evidence of subsequent remedial measures was admissible against
the defendant to prove that the plaintiff was injured by the
defectively manufactured product. 52 The court reasoned that it
had adopted strict liability as a theory of recovery to alleviate the
burden on a plaintiff of proving the defendant's negligence. 53 In
a strict liability case, a plaintiff does not have to prove that the
defendant knew or should have known that its product was
defective. 54 Instead, a plaintiff must prove that there was a defect
in the product when it left the defendant's control and the
defective condition was a major contributing factor in causing the
plaintiff's injuries. 55 Thus, the court of appeals determined that it
could not adopt a rule excluding evidence of subsequent remedial
measures, even though the evidence may suggest that the
defendant was negligent. 5 6 This is because negligence is simply
the facts at the time the injury occurred, and not what happened afterward. Id.
at 155, 15 N.E.at 310.
51. 52 N.Y.2d 114, 417 N.E.2d 545, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1981). In

Caprara,the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident that occurred as a
result of a defective ball joint which caused the automobile to swerve

uncontrollably and crash. Id. at 118, 417 N.E.2d at 547, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 25253. The plaintiff was rendered a quadraplegic. Id. at 118, 417 N.E.2d at 547,

436 N.Y.S.2d at 252. At trial, the plaintiff adduced evidence that the design of
the ball joint was altered about four years after this accident. Id. at 119. 417
N.E. at 547, 436 N.Y.S.at 253.
52. Id. at 126-27, 417 N.E.2d at 551, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 257.

53. Id. at 123, 417 N.E.2d at 549-50, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
54. Id.

55. Id. at 124, 417 N.E.2d at 550, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 255-56.
56. Id. at 124-25, 417 N.E.2d at 550, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 256 (stating that
"[in alleviating the problems of proof consumers formerly faced in
[negligence] cases, it cannot have been intended to countenance an evidentiary
rule which would so sweepingly exclude postaccident design evidence of a

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1996

13

Touro Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 2 [1996], Art. 13

438

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 12

irrelevant in a products liability action. 57 In addition, the court
determined that evidence of the design change was relevant to the

existence of a manufacturing defect in the automobile. 5 8 Thus,
the court held that the evidence was properly admitted.59
However, the Caprara court chose not to decide whether the
common law rule excluding evidence of subsequent remedial

measures was applicable to strict products liability cases
60
involving a design defect.
In Cover v. Cohen,6 1 the New York Court of Appeals rendered

a decision on the issue of design defects. In Cover, the court held
that in design defect cases, evidence of subsequent remedial
measures is not admissible to show that the defendant was at
fault. 62 The court of appeals based its decision on the reasoning
in Rainbow v. Albert Elia Building Co. 63 In Rainbow, the
defect simply because it touches on prior conduct which under present law is
irrelevant to liability").
57. Id.
58. Id. at 125-26, 417 N.E.2d at 551, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 256-57.
59. Id. at 126, 417 N.E.2d at 551, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
60. Id.
61. 61 N.Y.2d 261, 461 N.E.2d 864, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1984). In Cover,
the plaintiff was injured when a car designed and manufactued by the
defendant went out of control and crushed him against the wall of a building,
causing the need to amputate his leg. Id. at 267, 461 N.E.2d at 866, 473
N.Y.S.2d at 380. One of the plaintiff's theories at trial was that a design defect
in the car was the proximate cause of the accident. Id. at 268, 461 N.E.2d at
867, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 381. Evidence concerning a government safety standard
adopted after the vehicle was manufactured and of a service bulletin
disseminated after the sale of the vehicle was admitted at trial. Id. at 271, 274,
461 N.E.2d at 869, 871, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 383, 385. The court of appeals
declared that it was error to admit both pieces of evidence. Id. at 272, 274,
461 N.E.2d at 869, 871, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 383, 385.
62. Id. at 270, 461 N.E.2d at 868, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 382.
63. 79 A.D.2d 287, 436 N.Y.S.2d 480 (4th Dep't 1981), aff'd, 56 N.Y.2d
550, 434 N.E.2d 1345, 449 N.Y.S.2d 967 (1982). In Rainbow, the plaintiff
was injured when his motorcycle collided with a parked car. Id. at 288, 436
N.Y.S.2d at 481. His right leg was seriously injured, and he commenced a
strict products liability suit against the manufacturer. Id. at 289, 436 N.Y.S.2d
at 481-82. The plaintiff asserted that there was a defect in the design of the
motorcycle because there were no crash bars on the side, which would have
protected his legs. Id. at 289, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 481. The plaintiff sought to
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appellate division determined that design defect cases are similar

to negligence cases and different from manufacturing defect cases
because they call for a balance between the risk posed by the
product and utility of the product, and reasonable care must be
considered. 64 This is essentially a negligence standard. 65 For that
reason, it concluded that the rationale of the court in Capraradid
not apply to design defects, and admission of this evidence was
not allowed. 66 Hence, the court in Cover determined that design
defect cases are subject to the common law rule excluding

evidence of subsequent remedial measures, since they are similar
to actions based on negligence. 67
In addition, New York courts have established exceptions to
the commofi law rule prohibiting the admission of subsequent
remedial measures at trial. The courts have determined that in
negligence cases, this evidence may be admitted to prove issues
other than negligence. The New York Court of Appeals has
explicitly stated that evidence of subsequent remedial measures is

introduce evidence of a safety study conducted after the accident to prove that
the motorcycle should have contained crash bars. Id. at 290, 436 N.Y.S.2d at
482. The appellate division decided that the evidence had been properly
excluded as a post-accident modification. Id. at 292-93, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 48384.
64. Id. at 292-93, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 484.
65. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 31, at 169-171 (5th ed. 1984). Prosser states that:
Negligence is a matter of risk - that is to say, of recognizable danger of
injury. It has been defined as "conduct which involves an unreasonably
great risk of causing damage," or, more fully, conduct -which falls
below the standard established by lav for the protection of others
against unreasonable risk of harm.". . . Against this probability, and
gravity, of the risk, must be balanced in every case the utility of the
type of conduct in question.... While many risks are caused by simple
carelessness, many other risks may reasonably be run, with the full
approval of the community.
Id.
66. Id. at 293, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 484.
67. Cover, 61 N.Y.2d at 270, 461 N.E.2d at 868, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 382.
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admissible to impeach the credibility of a witness. 68 Moreover, it
has been held that this type of evidence "may be admissible if an
issue of control and maintenance exists." 69 However, the court of
appeals has cautioned that "[w]here such evidence becomes
admissible on some other theory or on another issue, such as

control, impeachment or feasibility of precautionary measures,
[judges] have thought it best... to accompany its receipt with

appropriate limiting instructions., 70
Federal Rule of Evidence 407 and the New York common law
rule are similar in that both rules prohibit the admission of this
68. Bush v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R. Co., 166 N.Y. 210, 216, 59 N.E.
838, 840 (1901). In Bush, the plaintiffs intestate was killed when the bridge
he was passing over, which was constructed and maintained by the defendant,
collapsed. Id. at 213-15, 59 N.E. at 839-40. The plaintiff claimed that the
accident occurred as a result of the defendant's negligence. Id. at 213, 59 N.E.
at 839. At trial, evidence of a subsequent remedial measure was admitted to
"contradict[] the testimony of the defendant's witnesses[,]" and not to prove
the negligence of the defendant. Id. at 216, 59 N.E. at 840. The court held that
the evidence was admissible for this purpose. Id. See Schechtman v. Lappin,
161 A.D.2d 118, 121, 554 N.Y.S.2d 846, 848 (1st Dep't 1990) (stating that in
an action based upon negligence, because the "plaintiff submitted [the]
evidence [of subsequent repairs] to impeach the defendants' credibility ... the
admission of this testimony into evidence was not error").
69. Klatz v. Armor Elevator Co., 93 A.D.2d 633, 637, 462 N.Y.S.2d
677, 680 (2d Dep't 1983). In Klatz, the plaintiffs sued an elevator company on
a theory of negligence for injuries sustained when the elevator fell two stories.
Id. at 633-34, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 678. The defendants were contractually
obligated to "service, inspect and repair the elevator." id. at 634, 462
N.Y.S.2d at 678. The plaintiffs requested production of the service record for
that particular elevator in order .to ascertain if any subsequent repairs had been
made. Id. at 635, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 679. The court held that these records were
inadmissible because there was no issue of control or maintenance, based on
the fact that the defendants were contractually obligated to maintain and repair
the elevator. Id. at 637, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 680. See Niemann v. Luca, 214
A.D.2d 658, 625 N.Y.S.2d 267 (2d Dep't 1995); Cacciolo v. Port Auth. of
N.Y., 186 A.D.2d 528, 588 N.Y.S.2d 350 (2d Dep't 1992); Olivia v. Gouze,
285 A.D. 762, 765, 140 N.Y.S.2d 438, 441 (1st Dep't 1955) (stating that
"[tihough proof of repairs made after the accident was not admissible as to
negligence, it was material and relevant as to control and maintenance"), aff'd,
1 N.Y.2d 811, 135 N.E.2d 602, 153 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1956).
70. Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114, 122, 417 N.E.2d 545,
549, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251, 255 (1981).
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type of evidence at trial to prove that the defendant was
negligent. Rule 407 also explicitly excludes this type of evidence
to prove the defendant's culpable conduct. 7 1 The courts of New

York do not seem to address this issue.
In addition, both rules allow admission of evidence of
subsequent remedial measures for purposes of impeachment, as
72
well as proving control of the object that caused the accident.
Rule 407 and cases interpreting the rule also permit this evidence

for purposes of showing feasibility of precautionary measures,
73
ownership, knowledge, identification, and condition.
Presumably, New York courts would admit this evidence if these

non-liability issues were raised.
However, federal law and New York law differ concerning
whether the rule barring evidence of subsequent remedial
measures extends to actions based on strict products liability.
While a majority of the federal circuits apply Rule 407 to exclude
evidence of subsequent remedial measures in strict products
liability actions and a minority do not, neither position
distinguishes between actions based on a manufacturing defect or
a design defect. New York, on the other hand, does. The New
York courts apply the exclusionary rule to strict products liability
actions based on a design defect, but do not apply it to actions
71. FED. R. EviD. 407. See Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, Inc., 831 F.2d
1191 (3d Cir. 1987). In Petree, the plaintiff sued the the defendant for
personal injuries suffered as a result of a design defect in a hydraulic press
manufactured by the defendant. Id. at 1192. After the press that injured the
plaintiff was sold, but before the plaintiff's accident, the defendant began
putting warnings on its newly manufactured presses concerning a danger that
part of the machine could be expelled if installed improperly. Id. at 1197. The
plaintiff sought to introduce this evidence to show that even though 'the design
of the press ha[d] not changed since 1959[,] ... the decal shows that the
defendant was aware of the projectile hazard before the time of the plaintiffs
injury in 1983." Id. The Third Circuit held that the evidence ' as inadmissible
pursuant to Rule 407 and stated that "the trial court acted properly in refusing
to admit the 1980 warning decal as evidence of culpable conduct." Id. at 119899 (emphasis added).
72. FED. R. EviD. 407.

73. Id.
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based on a manufacturing defect. Thus, Federal Rule of Evidence
407 and New York common law are similar in their treatment of
evidence concerning subsequent remedial measures in negligence
cases, but differ in the way they apply the exclusionary rule to
actions based on strict products liability.
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